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ABSTRACT  
 
A proposal is formulated in the present paper to improve the safety of existing and future 
nuclear reactors. The proposal is based upon the introduction of a new safety barrier against the 
release of radioactivity generated by the fission chain process. Basically, two motivations for the 
proposal arise: a) in the last two or three decades experimental evidence demonstrated that the 
established barrier constituted by the fuel pin clad is weak and easily trespassed by fission products 
during various phases of the fuel cycle, with main regard (here) to the in-core irradiation; b) the 
probability of core melt must (and can) be substantially lowered by adopting outcomes from recent 
researches with main reference to the reached capabilities of computational tools. Furthermore, the 
correct interpretation of the words ‘feedback from lessons learned’ impose that the conditions 
which led to the occurred severe accidents are understood to be not replicable in the future and, 
according to the statement of Australian and Chinese scientists, “upgrading and strengthening a 
nuclear regulatory system is not optional but imperative to prevent the next core meltdown”.  
The proposal aims at fixing bases for possible strengthening of current Nuclear Reactor 
Safety by combining the logical frameworks connected with the terms As-Low-As-Reasonably-
Achievable (ALARA), Best-Estimate-Plus-Uncertainty (BEPU), Extended-Safety-Margin (E-SM), 
Independent-Assessment (IA) and Emergency-Rescue-Team (ERT). The cost for the 
implementation of the additional barrier is expected to be affordable from a financial viewpoint and 
to contribute to restoring the public confidence towards nuclear technology. 
 
 
Introduction 
Nuclear Reactor Safety (NRS) constitutes a well-established technology at the time of 
writing this paper. About five-hundred Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units have been operated since 
the demonstration of the capability to control the fission reaction in 1942 and the connection of 
nuclear fission driven electricity generator to the electrical grid in 1954. A much larger number of 
reactors (a few thousands) have been constructed and successfully operated for purposes different 
from electricity production including research and production reactors as well as reactors used for 
marine propulsion. However, a) the number of NPP built and operated is far below the number 
envisaged by nuclear pioneers in the 50’s and far below a number consistent with the industrial 
growth, and b) accidents occurred, including a few catastrophic ones which severely impacted the 
exploitation of the technology. 
Two paradoxical situations can be identified for NRS nowadays: first, maturity was 
achieved at a time when the number of NPP units commissioned-constructed per year sharply 
dropped mainly as a consequence of the accidents in Three Mile Island (TMI-2) and in Chernobyl; 
second, interest from industry in implementing research findings and new ideas after those events 
declined leading to a sort of misalignment between technological capabilities and implementation 
status. Furthermore, concepts and principles in NRS were proposed by those who developed the 
nuclear technology in the middle of the past century and since then are embedded into any step of 
the process leading to electricity production. Those concepts and principles were adopted by other 
technologies later on and, still today, appear unsurpassed. The implementation of those concepts 
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and principles shall follow and did follow the progress in understanding and the development of 
new techniques. 
The Defense-in-Depth (DiD) which connects the principle of radioprotection with the 
design, the construction and the operational features of the nuclear reactors, can be taken as the 
imaginary skyline which drives the development of NRS. On the one hand, the Design Basis 
Accidents (DBA) have been introduced to demonstrate the robustness of DiD. On the other hand, 
safety functions, barriers and (even) calculated safety margins resulting from computational 
analyses constitute perceptible outcomes and provide a measure of the safety of current reactors. 
The established technological picture has been rusted (a) by the nuclear tragedies involving 
[now] conceivable accidents outside the DBA envelope, like Three Mile Island Unit 2, 1979, 
Chernobyl Unit 4, 1986 and Fukushima Units 1-4, 2011, and (b) in an elusive way by the evidence, 
collected in the last two or three decades, of the weakness of what is still considered the safety 
barrier constituted by the clad of nuclear fuel rods.  
Thus, an ambitious proposal is outlined to overcome the occurrence of conceivable accidents 
and the expected failure of the fuel clad barrier following DBA: the description of an additional 
safety barrier constitutes the content and the target for the present paper. Methodologies and 
findings from researches are gathered to form the basis for the design of the additional barrier.    .          
As a preliminary disclaim, two topics which are marginally or not considered hereafter are: 
human factors as key part of NRS and global political and economic strategies in the world which 
have an inevitable impact upon the exploitation of nuclear technology. 
 
1. Motivation 
Focus is given hereafter to two technological motivations for the present study, i.e. in 
addition to the public un-trust toward nuclear technology and the policies of government which also 
affect the worldwide energy market. 
The former motivation is quite obvious: severe accidents like those occurred in Three Mile 
Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima are not tolerable. It is clear that zero-risk owing to the operation 
of NPP is impossible to attain, as well as zero-probability per year of core melt. However, an 
attempt shall be made to bring the probability of core melt to the value which corresponds to the 
probability of fall of a disruptive meteorite on the site or in the region of the NPP. Corresponding 
risk, involving the impact of radiation upon the hit region and the survived population shall be 
accepted. The following statements by concerned scientists, [1], may be taken as backing the 
present study:  
 “In such a dangerous world, a high priority must be placed on efforts aimed at 
upgrading and enhancing nuclear safety regulatory system. With effective nuclear 
regulatory system nuclear accident like the Fukushima can be prevented”. 
 “Upgrading and strengthening a nuclear regulatory system is not optional but 
imperative to prevent the next core meltdown”. 
 “A credible nuclear watchdog must be an independent agency …” [current situation 
not satisfactory]. 
The latter motivation derives from an overview of current understanding of nuclear fuel 
performance during nominal operation and following accidents part of DBA. The condition High-
Burnup (HBU) and Beginning of Life (BOL) fuel shall be distinguished, although any distinction is 
fragile also because of the industry (NPP owner) tendency to attain HBU from any BOL situation. 
Let’s start the overview from the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) 
‘preliminary-draft’ Regulatory Guide (RG), [2], dealing with new maximum values of both Peak 
Cladding Temperature (PCT) and Equivalent Cladding Reacted (ECR): the values for PCT and 
ECR, never changed (so far) since the issuing values, part of the 10 CFR 50.46 in 1971, i.e. 2200 °F 
and 17% respectively; those values are now reduced to 2050 °F and linearly down to 2%, as a 
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function of ‘pre-transient H2 content into the clad’. It may be noted that high H2 concentration in 
the clad can be associated not only with HBU. A few hundred papers in open literature deal with 
Nuclear Fuel Failure (NFF) or rupture analysis. A comprehensive and systematic review is far 
beyond the scope here; one may easily find that NFF constitutes a complex topic where several 
phenomena and parameters contribute [3-6]. Groups of NFF mechanisms can be distinguished like: 
 Ballooning in case of Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) including recently 
characterized fuel relocation and power increase in the relocation region. 
Experimental data (measured together with inside rod pressure as a function 
of time) show clad temperature values at burst as low as 500 °C – 600 °C. 
 (Inter Granular, IG) Stress Corrosion Cracking [(IG)SCC], inducing Pellet 
Clad Mechanical Interaction (PCMI), and Pellet Clad Interaction due to 
Stress Corrosion Cracking (PCI/SCC).  
 Oxide formation, typically larger in HBU situation, induces spalling, hydride 
formation and embrittlement: spalled fuel favors hydriding and clad 
embrittlement even at low burnup.     
The weakness of the barrier constituted by the clad is emphasized from recent (experimental 
and calculational evidence as discussed in [3-6]. 
 
2. The elements of the additional barrier 
A summary interpretation of the NRS safety barriers, at the light of the discussion in the 
section above, can be derived from Fig. 1. More details are provided in section 2.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1. A vision for safety barriers: existing NPP and looking into the future 
 
Starting from the irradiated nuclear fuel (red ellipse at the center of the picture; the barrier 
sometimes associated with the pellet is neglected here), the following barriers are identified (red 
labels B1 to B5 in the figure): 
 The B1 deals with fuel and clad (basically clad, according to the assumption above) and is 
the barrier in relation to which the weakness is discussed in section 1. 
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 The B2 is constituted by the pressure boundary for the primary circuit: this exists in all 
water cooled reactors. 
 The B3, not usually recognized as a barrier in NRS technology: it is designed according to 
different philosophies and exists in all water cooled reactors. This is constituted by the 
installed Engineered Safety Features (ESF) and, noticeably, includes the Emergency Core 
Cooling Systems (ECCS).  
 The B4 is constituted by the containment and, including the ‘confinement’ installed in 
majority of VVER-440 and the common pressure building installed in one Canadian 
Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) NPP, exists in all water cooled reactors. 
 The B5 is the additional ‘risk-informed - technological’ barrier which constitutes the topic 
of the proposal in the present paper. 
Furthermore, the following notes apply: 
 The B1 and the B2 (clear blue in Fig. 1) are introduced according to design needs of 
reactors. 
 The B3, the B4 and the B5 (when available) are designed according to NRS needs. 
 The B5 is expected to substitute the B1 once B1 weakness is (formally) recognized. 
 In relation to each barrier, further characterization is provided in Fig. 1 (upper right), e.g. 
including the attributes ‘mechanical’, ‘concrete’, ‘electronic’, etc. 
The additional barrier B5 is constituted by a combination of the following elements, which 
have a heterogeneous nature and role: the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) principle, 
the Independent Assessment (IA) requirement, the Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty (BEPU) 
approach, the Extended Safety Margin (E-SM) concept and the Emergency Rescue Team (ERT), 
now a virtual reality. ALARA, IA, BEPU and E-SM are discussed in [7] with more details given in 
[8-10] and ERT is introduced in [11]. The elements are shortly discussed in sections 2.1 and 2.2, 
distinguishing between ‘software’ and ‘hardware’ and their combined role is outlined in 2.3. 
2.1. The ‘software’ elements   
ALARA, BEPU and IA constitute the software elements of B5.  
Namely, the correspondence between ALARA and BEPU has been identified at first [7], by 
noting that the best use of computational tools according with current understanding is consistent 
(or even a direct consequence) of the early established principle imposing the minimizing of the 
radiation impact upon the environment and the population.     
BEPU constitutes an approach which originally drove the application of thermal-hydraulics 
system codes into the licensing process of water cooled reactors, e.g. [8-9]. Suitable procedures for 
Verification and Validation, for addressing the scaling issue, for demonstration of quality and 
calculation of uncertainty in code predictions and for suitable coupling of codes (e.g. neutron 
physics and thermal-hydraulics) are among the pillars of BEPU. 
The IA requirement, although established since the early developments of nuclear 
technology, later on became of difficult application owing to the increasing sophistication of NPP 
which implies (more) proprietary data needed for safety demonstration [10].     
2.2. The ‘hardware’ elements 
E-SM and ERT constitute the hardware elements of B5. 
Safety Margins (SM) are well known words in NRS: suitable safety margins must be 
demonstrated and are part of design, construction and operation of existing reactors. The acronym 
E-SM, [9], implies a substantial increase in the number of parameters which shall be at the origin of 
one independent SM, the combination of two or several SM to create a sort of macroscopic SM and 
an about two orders of magnitude increase of signals from any operating reactors. The last feature 
suggested to include E-SM among the new hardware needed to implement B5. 
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The ERT consists of a group of highly trained and specialized rescuers, [11], who owns 
suitable machinery and equipment (helicopters, Diesel Generators, DG, etc.) and the access to each 
nuclear reactor installed within an assigned geographic region. Here, ‘access’ means: (a) availability 
of plugs to connect DG feed-pump delivery sides to primary and secondary circuits of reactor and to 
ensure cooling of even damaged core; ERT team should arrive at the concerned site within one-hour 
(i.e. a time span lower than the time needed for massive core melt), based on E-SM signals; (b) 
possibility to induce scram of the reactor from remote location (this capability is already available 
in some Countries in special Nuclear Center under the control of a Government regulatory 
Institution).         
2.3. A sketch for the barrier 
The summary sketch of the elements which constitute B5 is given in Fig. 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2. Summary sketch of elements which constitute the additional safety barrier (B5) 
  
Let’s first substantiate the terms adopted for defining the B5 in Fig. 1: a risk-informed 
technological barrier, needing electronic / computational system, ERT supported. The words ‘risk-
informed’ requires full consideration of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) techniques as well 
as integration of those techniques into the Integrated Risk Informed Decision Making (IRIDM) 
framework [12]. The word ‘technological’ reflects the need of consistency between the elements of 
the barrier and the technology growth including the database of knowledge (e.g. a new magnitude 
of earthquake in an assigned geographical region): the B5 shall be constantly upgraded. The word 
‘electronic’ gives the proper emphasis to: a) the consideration of Instrumentation and Control (I & 
C) into the safety analysis; b) the design, the installations and the operation of (an order of 
magnitude) 10
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 detectors for fulfilling the E-SM element needs. The word ‘computational’ stresses 
the importance of analyses which are qualified and independent from the designer-owner of the 
reactor. The words ‘ERT supported’ emphasized the need for ERT: E-SM continuously monitors 
the NPP, the environment and the workers actions and solicit the intervention of ERT.             
The B5 safety barrier is a dynamic system tailored to each reactor, although design 
philosophy as well as procedures and databases are in common to all reactors.  
The concerned NPP Unit is the starting point for the design of B5 (top left in the diagram): 
the information database dealing with design, construction and operation of the reactor is relevant. 
The regulatory framework at the basis of the licensing of the Unit (i.e., the item ‘NRS requirements 
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at the top of the diagram) shall form the second database needed to start the process for constituting 
the B5. ALARA is a driving principle in this connection.  
The role of Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), including any licensing document issued 
in relation to the NPP Unit is clarified as follows. A ‘standard’ FSAR, according to regulations is 
available for any existing Unit or is expected to be issued for new (future) built reactors. This is part 
of the second database mentioned in the previous paragraph. A new FSAR, independent of the first 
one and basically including the same information is expected to be created and to form a cross-
cutting element for the B5: the new FSAR is called BEPU-FSAR, central element in the diagram; 
its cross-cutting nature is visualized by the dotted bounded ellipse on the central-left of the diagram. 
The BEPU techniques and/or approach (central element in the diagram), originally derived 
from nuclear thermal-hydraulics and applied for accident analysis, [7], are extended to cover any 
analytic parts of the (new) FSAR, [13], leading to the so called BEPU-FSAR (i.e. the ‘new’ FSAR). 
IA, left of the diagram, constitutes a requirement for the ‘new’ FSAR. Independent assessors 
should have access to the NPP Unit design and licensing information (first and second database 
above mentioned) and develop the ‘new’ FSAR, [10]. Because of the proprietary nature of 
information in the databases, although independent assessors are not in competition with industry 
(either designer or owner of the NPP), the IA is expected as the critical element for the overall 
process. 
The E-SM set of safety margins and corresponding transducers on the field (central bottom 
of the diagram) can be determined by a specific procedure, [9], supported by the outcomes of 
BEPU-FSAR analyses. 
The ERT operation (bottom right of the diagram) is expected to be informed by the E-SM, 
i.e. horizontal arrow in the diagram.               
The combination of BEPU application (noticeably leading to BEPU-FSAR) and E-SM, 
driven by IA and under the umbrella of ALARA, with the support of ERT, forms the additional 
dynamic safety barrier (bottom of diagram).    
 
3. The application of the barrier  
A trivial (rough and approximate) use of the barrier during the course of the ‘historical’ 
severe accidents which hit the nuclear technology and an (again rough and approximate) evaluation 
of the cost are at the origin of the notes in the following subsections.  
 A detailed thermal-hydraulic description of the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and 
Fukushima events can be found in [14], till the time when an irreversible (i.e. a situation in relation 
to which current technological capabilities to prevent further excursion of the event are challenged) 
core damage occurred. The provided information (not reported here) is the background for the notes 
related to the expected performance of the B5 in those cases.   
3.1. Three Mile Island Accident   
In case of the TMI-2 accident, B5 would have stopped (i.e. by generating a scram signal) the 
operation of the unit well before the event. The simultaneous closure of the manual Auxiliary Feed-
Water (AFW) valve and the leaking Pilot Operated Relief Valve (PORV) are a typical combined 
failure which would have caused a red alarm from E-SM detectors. So the accident would have not 
even been triggered.    
ERT was not needed. 
3.2. Chernobyl Accident 
 The conditions which caused and/or are the roots for the explosion came into place at least 
24 hours before the event. A number of mismatches between measured parameter values and 
allowed parameter values occurred different times in this period. The issue was that the operators 
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decided to ignore and /or were demanded to ignore those mismatches. A critical human factors 
problem occurred.      
ERT intervention became needed because of the repeated controversial actions by NPP 
operators. At first, a remote ERT controlled scram would have occurred. An ERT team, properly 
supported by Country Army should have intervened removing negligent operators. The Chernobyl 
accident would have not occurred.   
3.3. Fukushima Accidents 
Events in Fukushima Units 1 to 3 are considered here.  
The signal challenging the B5 in each of the three units would have been the earthquake: its 
magnitude above the design value would have caused scram (which actually happened during the 
event) and would have alerted ERT (clearly this did not happen).     
ERT intervention needed because of the severity of the earthquake and of the consequent 
tsunami (possible satellite-based measurement of the tsunami wave height should have contributed 
to the alert of the ERT team). Proper ERT action would have prevented extended core damage.   
3.4. Cost of the additional barrier  
Dealing with (absolute) cost of B5 imposes three preliminary notes, where values are given 
in US$: (a) the cost of one NPP Unit, typically 1000 Mwe size is around to 5 Billion; (b) the cost 
for recovering from a severe accident including damage to land and to population (cases of 
Chernobyl and Fukushima) is in the order of magnitude of 1 Trillion; (c) the selling value of 
electricity produced in two-months operation of one Unit, this means 1/300 time for the overall NPP 
life (assumed 60 years), is around 50 Million. 
The rough estimation for the cost of the additional ‘dynamic’ barrier B5, design and 
operation gives: cost comparable with (c) value; cost around 1% of the (a) value; cost around 
0.005% of the (b) value. 
One may further elaborate on the cost of B5 by noting that X% of the total cost can be 
shared by many NPP units (e.g. databases, computational tools, skill of analysts, etc.) and Y% is the 
cost which applies to each ‘individual’ Unit. Typical values for X and Y can be 70 and 30, 
respectively.              
 
Conclusions 
The decline of nuclear technology, appearing irreversible so far mostly in the Countries 
where it was developed, and the assembling of recent research findings brought to the proposal for a 
new safety barrier for existing and new nuclear reactors. 
The unacceptability of severe accidents expected from the operation of NPP, the need to 
pursue in a rigorous way the independent assessment and the weaknesses, now evident, of the fuel 
clad as a barrier against the release of fission products, suggested the proposal for a resilient-
dynamic additional safety barrier.  
The BEPU methodological approach pursued by independent assessors plus an extended-
detailed monitoring of the plant status, plus the support in extreme situations by a NPP external 
rescue team, contribute to form the additional barrier which is expected: 
 to reduce the probability of core melt down to values which correspond to the fall on 
the reactor of a site damaging meteorite, 
 to reduce the current risk of large radioactivity release for a factor in the range 10 – 
100, 
 to have the potential to contribute in restoring the public trust towards nuclear 
technology.      
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Although selected pieces of the overall spectrum of activities for the new barrier are 
established achievements for the current technology, thorough investigations shall be planned to 
confirm the feasibility of the barrier. Namely, this applies in relation to a) the identification of 
parameters to be monitored which constitute a suitable set of E-SM, b) the demonstration of 
reduction of the core melt probability, and c) the confirmation of the availability of financial 
resources and competences to design and operate the barrier. A suitable solution for the IA should 
also be attained, possibly considering the proposal in a referenced paper (i.e. [10]). 
Finally, current safety culture including international institutions dealing with nuclear safety 
appears adequate and appropriate even for creating the framework for the present proposal. 
However, it shall be accepted that human factors in a broad sense, i.e. individuals initiating a war or 
planning a terroristic attack against a nuclear installation and the extreme natural event like the fall 
of a large meteorite on the site, put challenges to the release of fission products which cannot be 
confined or satisfactorily weakened by any safety barrier.            
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